The Robustness of CAPM-A Computational Approach by Herings, P.J.J. & Kubler, F.
  
 
The Robustness of CAPM-A Computational Approach
Citation for published version (APA):
Herings, P. J. J., & Kubler, F. (2000). The Robustness of CAPM-A Computational Approach. (METEOR
research memorandum; No. 002). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and
Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2000
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
The Robustness of CAPM-A Computational Approach

P. Jean-Jacques Herings
y
Department of Economics
University of Maastricht
Felix Kubler
z
Department of Economics
Stanford University
January 21, 2000
Abstract
In this paper we argue that in realistically calibrated two period general equilib-
rium models with incomplete markets CAPM-pricing provides a good benchmark for
equilibrium prices even when agents are not mean-variance optimizers and returns
are not normally distributed. We numerically approximate equilibria for a variety
of dierent specications for preferences, endowments and dividends and compare
the equilibrium prices and portfolio-holdings to the predictions of CAPM. While we
show that CAPM cannot hold exactly for the chosen specication, it turns out that
pricing-errors are extremely small. Furthermore, two-fund separation holds approxi-
mately.
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1 Introduction
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) pre-
dicts that equilibrium returns of assets are a linear function of their market  (the slope
in the regression of a security's return on the market's return). This intuitively appealing
result has long shaped the way practitioners think about average returns and risk. While
the model fares poorly in explaining observed cross-sectional stock returns (see for exam-
ple Fama and French (1992)) it remains one of the central building blocks in nancial
economics.
One of the reasons for this is that the CAPM provides a good theoretical starting point
for the examination of asset prices. Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) show that CAPM
can be viewed as a special case of the general equilibrium model with incomplete asset
markets (the GEI-model). Oh (1996), Willen (1997) and others have shown that the
central conclusions of CAPM, the pricing formula, holds true under completely general
dividends and endowments as long as all agents have mean-variance utility functions.
However, without mean-variance preferences one has to make very strong assumptions
on the distribution of asset pay-os in order to derive the conclusions of CAPM
1
. Berk
(1997) shows that joint restrictions on utility functions and asset returns cannot lead to
more realistic assumptions. He shows that if one assumes that agents have von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions, quadratic utility is necessary for the CAPM-pricing formula
to hold. Since quadratic utility is an unattractive assumption, it is an important question
whether CAPM-pricing provides a benchmark for the cross section of security prices in a
model with more general preferences, endowments and asset returns. Empirical contradic-
tions of CAPM might be explained by the fact that some agents are not mean-variance
optimizers and that many securities have returns that are far from elliptical.
In this paper we show that independently of mean-variance preferences or normal re-
turns, the CAPM pricing formula often provides a very good prediction for actual equi-
librium returns. It is clear, of course, that it is always possible to construct economies
where equilibrium asset prices are arbitrarily far from those predicted by CAPM. We do
not provide a theoretical explanation for the documented phenomenon but instead com-
pute hundreds of examples which illustrate it (see Judd (1997) for a general discussion
which favors this approach to economic theory) - we approximate equilibria numerically
(using the algorithm developed in Herings and Kubler (2000)) and compare the prices and
portfolio-holdings predicted by CAPM to the actual equilibrium prices and equilibrium
portfolio-holdings. In all cases we consider, CAPM pricing is an excellent benchmark for
the equilibrium prices. These results are robust with respect to variations in preferences,
endowments and dividends.
In order to show that the CAPM pricing formula provides a good approximation to
asset returns in realistically calibrated models, one rst has to clarify what one means
by 'realistically calibrated'. We follow the macroeconomic literature and we choose rst
1
Ross (1978) provides a complete characterization of the class of separating distribution
2
and second moments of endowments and dividends to roughly match annual US data
and preferences to exhibit relative risk aversion below 10 and nondecreasing absolute risk
aversion (see e.g. Mehra and Prescott (1985))
2
.
More importantly one has to argue that the computed examples are not sensitive to
the exact specication of the model but that they reect some general property of asset
prices. We assume that there are three agents and 32; 768 states of nature and we examine
the robustness of CAPM with respect to 600 dierent specications of preferences and
endowments: We rst assume that endowments and dividends are log-normally distributed
and consider the following 3 specications for preferences.
 All three agents have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions.
 All agents' utility functions exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
 Agents' utility-functions exhibit loss aversion as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
For each case we randomly generate 100 economies which dier with respect to agents'
(heterogeneous) degrees of risk aversion.
In the next three cases we x preferences and vary distributions of dividends and
endowments. We assume that all agents have CRRA utility functions and consider the
following distributions for assets and endowments.
 Endowments and dividends are drawn from a uniform distribution, We randomly
generate 100 economies with dier with respect to the support of the uniform distri-
butions.
 Endowments and dividends are determined by two factors and an idiosyncratic shock
each of which are drawn from a log-normal distribution. We randomly generate 100
economies with dier with respect to the factor-loads.
 Endowments and dividends are drawn from a log-normal distribution and there is an
option on one of the stocks. We randomly generate 100 economies which dier with
respect to the strike-price of the option.
For all 600 economies under consideration we compare the computed return on indi-
vidual stocks to the return predicted by the CAPM-pricing formula. We nd that in all
600 cases the average mean squared pricing errors (for returns) across stocks lie below 0.04
percent. The average error across all simulations is in the order of magnitude of 0.005
percent. In addition to predicting asset returns, the CAPM also predicts that all agents'
equilibrium portfolio-holdings will consist of the riskless bond and a mutual fund of risky
assets. It is possible that CAPM-pricing is very accurate, but two-fund separation does not
2
Note that just as in Mehra and Prescott this calibration is very unrealistic with respect to the market
risk-premium. This fact might give a rst indication of why CAPM-pricing does so well in our framework.
3
apply. Nevertheless, in the computed examples two-fund separation holds almost exactly
in the equilibria we compute.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a short introduction to the model
and collect several general results on CAPM in a general equilibrium setting. Section 3
gives an example of a realistically calibrated economy with non-elliptical returns and CRRA
preferences for which CAPM-pricing provides an almost perfect prediction. In Sections 4
and 5 we examine the robustness of this phenomenon. In Section 4 we vary the parameters
of risk aversion for the CRRA case, we consider CARA utility functions, and we examine
utility functions displaying loss aversion. In Section 5 we x preferences to exhibit constant
relative risk aversion and we examine the robustness of CAPM with respect to dividend-
distributions. In Section 6 we speculate about possible explanations and conclude the
paper.
2 The Two-Period Finance Economy
The nance version of the GEI-model describes an economy over two periods of time,
t = 0; 1; with uncertainty over the state of nature resolving in period t = 1. We describe the
model, introduce the necessary notation and discuss the CAPM. For a thorough description
of the GEI-model see for example Magill and Quinzii (1996).
2.1 The Model
There are S + 1 states in the economy; at time t = 0 the economy is in state s = 0; at
time t = 1 one state of nature s out of S possible states of nature realizes. In each state
s = 0; : : : ; S; there is a single nondurable consumption good.
There are H agents, indexed by h = 1; : : : ; H; that participate in the economy. Each
agent h is characterized by initial endowments (the initial income stream) e
h
= (e
h
0
; e
h
1
; : : : ; e
h
S
)
>
2
int(X
h
)
3
and his preferences over consumption bundles (income streams available for con-
sumption) c
h
= (c
h
0
; c
h
1
; : : : ; c
h
S
)
>
2 X
h
. Here X
h
is a closed subset of IR
S+1
that satises
fx
h
g+IR
S+1
+
 X
h
for all x
h
2 X
h
: In most applicationsX
h
will be equal to IR
S+1
+
or IR
S+1
:
To distinguish between rst-period consumption and the random second period consump-
tion, we dene
e
x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
S
)
>
for any vector x = (x
0
; x
1
; : : : ; x
S
)
>
. Aggregate endow-
ments (aggregate incomes) are e =
P
H
h=1
e
h
: Each agents' preferences are represented by a
utility function u
h
: X
h
! IR satisfying standard assumptions; u
h
is strictly quasi-concave
and continuous. Moreover, the set X
h
(e
h
) = fx
h
2 X
h
j u
h
(x
h
)  u
h
(e
h
)g is assumed
to be bounded from below, a property automatically satised when X
h
is bounded from
below. In the applications of Sections 3   5 we consider economies where all agents have
separable utility functions across date-events with identical probabilities, i.e. there exist
3
int(X
h
) denotes the interior of X
h
:
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probabilities 
1
; : : : ; 
S
> 0;
P
S
s=1

s
= 1, such that
u
h
(c
h
) = v
h
0
(c
h
0
) + 
h
S
X
s=1

s
v
h
s
(c
h
s
);
where 
h
> 0 is the discount factor, X
h
=
Q
S
s=0
X
h
s
; where X
h
s
is a subset of IR; and
v
h
s
: X
h
s
! IR is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. In this case it follows
from the properties of v
h
s
that X
h
(e
h
) is bounded from below. When the functions v
h
s
are
independent of s; we say that agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
There are J assets. Asset j pays dividends at date t = 1 which we denote by d
j
2 IR
S
:
The price of asset j at time t = 0 is q
j
. Without loss of generality we assume that the
assets are in zero net supply and we collect all assets' dividends in a pay-o matrix
A = (d
1
; ::::; d
J
) 2 IR
SJ
:
At time t = 0 agent h chooses a portfolio-holding 
h
2 IR
J
which uniquely denes the
agents' consumption by
e
c
h
=
e
h
+ A
h
and c
h
0
= e
h
0
  
h
 q. The net demand of agent h;
e
c
h
 
e
h
; belongs to the marketed subspace hAi = fz 2 IR
S
j 9 2 IR
J
; z = Ag:
The exogenous parameters dening a nance economy E = ((X
h
; u
h
; e
h
)
h=1;:::;H
;A)
are agents' consumption sets, utility functions and endowments, and the pay-o matrix.
Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that there are no redundant assets,
rank(A) = J: If there are redundant assets, it follows from an arbitrage argument that
their price is uniquely determined by the price of the other assets. Markets are incomplete
when J < S. We dene asset prices to be arbitrage free if it is not possible to achieve a
positive income stream in all states by trading in the available assets. It is well known that
a price system q 2 IR
J
precludes arbitrage if and only if there exists a state price vector
 2 IR
S
++
such that q = 
>
A. We dene Q to be the set of arbitrage free asset prices.
Definition 2.1 (Competitive Equilibrium): A competitive equilibrium for an
economy E is a collection of portfolio-holdings 

= (
1
; : : : ; 
H
) 2 IR
HJ
and asset prices
q

2 IR
J
that satisfy the following conditions:
(1) 
h
2 argmax

h
2IR
J u
h
(c
h
) s:t: c
h
= e
h
+
 
 q

>
A
!

h
and c
h
2 X
h
; h = 1; : : : ; H;
(2)
P
H
h=1

h
= 0.
Under an additional assumption of strictly increasing utility functions, existence of an
equilibrium follows from the results of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
2.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) use the portfolio analysis developed by Tobin (1958)
and Markowitz (1959) to examine an equilibrium model of nancial markets. Under the
5
assumption that all agents are mean-variance optimizers they derive a closed-form solution
for equilibrium returns, the so-called -pricing formula. This formula relates the return of
a risky asset to the return of the market portfolio by the covariance of that asset with the
market. It is well known that the -pricing formula can be derived in the nance GEI-
model, see Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990). To x notation and to give some intuition
for the computational results in Sections 3  5; we summarize and slightly generalize the
ndings in the literature - Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990), Magill and Quinzii (1996), Oh
(1996), and Willen (1997) - to cover the case with mean-variance preferences, non-marketed
endowments and a nite state space in a world with incomplete markets.
We denote by 1
n
= (1; : : : ; 1)
>
2 IR
n
the vector of all ones. The m-th unit vector of
appropriate dimension is denoted 
m
- the dimension of 
m
is always apparent from the
context. Throughout this subsection we assume that there exist objective probabilities 
s
;
s = 1; : : : ; S; over the possible states of nature in period 1: Moreover, asset 1 is a riskless
bond, d
1
= 1
S
. For a random variable x 2 IR
S
; we dene its expected value E(x) =
P
S
s=1

s
x
s
, for two random variables x; y 2 IR
S
; we dene the covariance as cov(x; y) =
P
S
s=1

s
x
s
y
s
  E(x)E(y): The variance of a random variable x 2 IR
S
is given by var(x) =
cov(x; x). Finally, we dene x 

y =
P
S
s=1

s
x
s
y
s
for vectors x; y 2 IR
S
.
For any competitive equilibrium (

; q

); there exists a unique state price vector in the
marketed subspace 

A
2 hAi such that, for all assets j q

j
= 

A


d
j
: Using the denitions
of variance and covariance, this implies
q

j
= E(

A
)E(d
j
) + cov(

A
; d
j
): (1)
We dene the return of a portfolio  2 IR
J
with q

  6= 0 by r

=
A
q


and we denote the
return of the riskless bond by R
f
=
1
q

1
: With this we rewrite equation (1) as
q

j
=
1
R
f
E(d
j
) + cov(

A
; d
j
):
We dene the pricing portfolio as the unique portfolio 

A
which solves A

A
= 

A
.
Notice that
q

 

A
= 

A


A

A
= 

A




A
> 0;
where 

A
6= 0 follows from E(

A
) = q

1
> 0:
Since the return of the pricing portfolio satises r


A
=
A

A
q



A
=


A


A




A
we can rewrite
equation (1) as
E(r

)  R
f
=
cov(r

; r


A
)
var(r


A
)
(E(r


A
)  R
f
): (2)
While equation (2) relates the prices of the risky assets and looks similar to the CAPM
pricing formula, this formula is rather useless if we have no further information on 

A
. Note
that so far all formulas followed simply from the absence of arbitrage. It is well known that
under the assumption that one agent h's utility function is dierentiable and that in an
6
equilibrium with individual consumption (c
h
)
h2H
, agent h's utility maximization problem
has an interior solution, 

A
can be characterized as


A
= proj
hAi
0
@
@
c
h
1
u
h
(c
h
)=
s
@
c
h
0
u
h
(c
h
)
; : : : ;
@
c
h
S
u
h
(c
h
)=
s
@
c
h
0
u
h
(c
h
)
1
A
;
where proj
hAi
denotes the projection on hAi under the inner product .
One possibility to derive an interesting pricing formula is to assume that all preferences
just depend on the mean and the variance of consumption,
u
h
(c
h
) = w
h
(c
h
0
;E(
e
c
h
); var(
e
c
h
));
where w
h
is strictly increasing in c
h
0
and in the expected consumption and strictly decreasing
in the variance of consumption.
Agent h's rst period endowments can be decomposed into a marketed part and a non-
marketed part, where the latter part lies orthogonal to the marketed subspace under the
inner product : We write
e
h
=
e
h
M
+
e
h
?
and have by denition
e
h
?


z = 0 for all z 2 hAi. This decomposition is uniquely deter-
mined. We dene the marketed endowments
e
M
=
P
H
h=1
e
h
M
and the market portfolio 
M
as the unique portfolio satisfying
A
M
=
e
M
:
Note that it may happen that q

 
M
= 0; even when
e
 0:
4
To simplify matters, we rst assume q

 
M
6= 0 and then argue that this assumption is
not necessary. Given a competitive equilibrium (

; q

); we dene 

for a portfolio  2 IR
J
by


=
cov(r

; r

M
)
var(r

M
)
:
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 2.3: Under the assumptions that all agents maximize mean-variance util-
ity functions with objective probabilities ; var(
e
M
) > 0, and there is a riskless bond, each
equilibrium (

; q

) of E with equilibrium consumption (c
1
; : : : ; c
H
) has the following prop-
erties.
1. The CAPM-pricing formula holds; when q

 
M
6= 0; then for each  2 IR
J
;
E(r

) R
f
= 

(E(r

M
)  R
f
): (3)
4
For a vector x 2 IR
m
we use the notation x  0 if x 2 IR
m
+
; x > 0 if x 2 IR
m
+
n f0g; and x  0 if
x 2 IR
m
++
:
7
2. Two-fund separation holds; for each agent h there exists (
h
1
; 
h
2
) 2 IR  IR
+
; where
P
H
h=1

h
1
= 0 and
P
H
h=1

h
2
= 1; such that
e
c
h
 
e
h
?
= 
h
1
1
S
+ 
h
2
A
M
:
3. The pricing vector satises 

A
= 
1
1
S
  
2
e
M
; with 
1
> 
2
E(
e
) and 
2
strictly
positive.
Proof. We rst show that a pseudo two-fund separation holds in the sense that the
agents' consumption bundles can be written as
e
c
h
=
e
h
?
+
e

h
1
1
S
+
e

h
2


A
for some
e

h
1
;
e

h
2
2 IR.
Dene
e
c
h
=
e
h
?
+ proj
h1
S
;

A
i
(
e
c
h
):
Suppose pseudo two-fund separation does not hold, so
e
c
h
6=
e
c
h
. Since 

A


(
e
c
h
 
e
c
h
) = 0;
it follows that the portfolios needed to consume
e
c
h
and
e
c
h
are as expensive at date 0.
Moreover,
e
h
?


(
e
c
h
 
e
c
h
) = 0 and 1
S


(
e
c
h
 
e
c
h
) = 0; so it follows that E(
e
c
h
 
e
c
h
) = 0
and cov(
e
c
h
 
e
c
h
;
e
c
h
) = 0: Therefore, E(
e
c
h
) = E(
e
c
h
) and var(
e
c
h
) > var(
e
c
h
); giving a
contradiction to the optimality of
e
c
h
at prices q

: We obtain pseudo two-fund separation.
Since in equilibrium
e
M
=
P
H
h=1
(
e
c
h
 
e
h
?
), the two-fund separation property implies
that
e
M
2 h1
S
; 

A
i. The assumption var(
e
M
) > 0 implies that
e
M
is not collinear to 1
S
and it holds that 

A
= 
1
1
S
 
2
e
M
for some numbers 
1
; 
2
: Two-fund separation follows
immediately,
e
c
h
 
e
h
?
= 
h
1
1
S
+ 
h
2
A
M
for some numbers 
h
1
; 
h
2
:
Since
e
M
=
P
H
h=1

h
1
1
S
+
P
H
h=1

h
2
e
M
and var(
e
M
) > 0; we have
P
H
h=1

h
1
= 0 and
P
H
h=1

h
2
= 1: Consider a consumption bundle c
h
 
that results from using the income that
is invested in the market portfolio to buy the riskless bond, so
e
c
h
 
=
e
h
?
+ 
h
1
1
S
+ 
h
2
(

A


A
M
=q

1
)1
S
: The portfolios needed to consume
e
c
h
and
e
c
h
 
are as expensive since 

A


(
e
c
h
 
e
c
h
 
) = 0: Since var(
e
c
h
 
)  var(
e
c
h
) and u
h
(c
h
 
)  u
h
(c
h
); it holds that E(
e
c
h
 
)   E(
e
c
h
) =
 (
h
2

2
=q

1
)var(
e
M
)  0; where we use that 

A


A
M
= q

1
E(
e
M
) 
2
var(
e
M
): The preceding
inequalities are strict inequalities when 
h
2
> 0; which is the case for at least one agent.
Then it follows that 
2
> 0 and 
h
2
 0; h = 1; : : : ; H: Since 0 < q

1
= E(

A
) = 
1
 

2
E(
e
M
); and 1
S


e
?
= 0; so E(
e
M
) = E(
e
); it holds that 
1
> 
2
E(
e
):
The CAPM pricing formula is obtained by substituting 

A
= 
1

1
 
2

M
in equation (2).
From
cov(r

; r


A
)
var(r


A
)
=  
q

 

A

2
q

 
M
cov(r

; r

M
)
var(r

M
)
and
E(r


A
)  R
f
=

1
  
2
E(A
M
)
q

 

A
  R
f
;
8
it follows that
E(r

)  R
f
= 

 

1
  
2
E(A
M
)
 
2
q

 
M
+
R
f
(
1
q

1
  
2
q

 
M
)

2
q

 
M
!
= 

(E(r

M
) R
f
):
Q.E.D.
We assume in the theorem that var(
e
M
) > 0: The theorem also holds true for the
degenerate case where
e
M
is collinear to 1
S
, but since the proof of this simple fact is rather
tedious it is omitted.
Note that for the case where the endowments are spanned, i.e. where e
h
?
= 0 for all
h; the pricing formula reduces to the standard CAPM-formula (see Magill and Quinzii
(1996)).
It might be sensible to dene the market portfolio somewhat dierently as a portfolio
of risky assets only. This claries the concept of two-fund separation, since then one
fund consists of risky assets only. In this case dene
b

M
= (0; 
M,2
; : : : ; 
M;J
): If we dene
b


= cov(r

; r
b

M
)=var(r
b

M
) it turns out that the pricing formula still holds. After some
substitutions, one obtains
E(r

)  R
f
=
b


(E(r
b

M
)  R
f
):
Even more generally, dene the market portfolio
e

M
as an arbitrary combination of a
portfolio consisting of the riskless asset only and the portfolio
b

M
; so
e

M
= 
1

1
+ 
2
b

M
;
where 
2
6= 0: Then it holds that 

A
=
e

1

1
 
e

2
e

M
; where
e

2
6= 0: If we dene
e


=
cov(r

; r
e

M
)=var(r
e

M
); then
E(r

)  R
f
=
e


(E(r
e

M
)  R
f
):
The proof is identical to the one of Theorem 2.3, when 
1
; 
2
; and 
M
are substituted by
e

1
;
e

2
; and
e

M
: This result also oers a way out when q

 
M
= 0: One may simply use
e

M
= 
M
+ "
1
with " > 0 to derive the pricing formula. Indeed, q


e

M
= "q

1
> 0:
The version of two-fund separation we consider in Theorem 2.3 is slightly more general
than the usual one, where it is assumed that initial the initial income stream e
h
of every
agent is marketed. As a consequence one obtains the formula
e
c
h
= 
h
1
1
S
+ 
h
2
e
when endowments are marketed. In the more general case considered in Theorem 2.3, the
nal income stream consumed by each agent consists not only of the returns of a linear
combination of the riskless bond and the market portfolio, but also of the undiversiable
non-marketed individual part of the initial income stream,
e
h
?
:
Finally, note that the concept of marketed endowments is not needed to dene the
pricing vector. Since
e
?
is orthogonal to hAi; the pricing vector can also be dened by
9
e

A
= 
1
1
S
  
2
e
: Of course it no longer holds that
e


A
2 hAi: Moreover, income streams
not in hAi are typically priced dierently by
e


A
than by 

A
:
As we have discussed in the introduction, Theorem 2.3 can only be obtained when one
is willing to make very restrictive assumptions. As Magill and Quinzii (1996) put it when
commenting on representative agent models and the CAPM: \As we indicated above these
models are interesting since they lead to clearcut results which have strong intuitive appeal.
However the restrictive nature of the hypothesis made could cast doubt on the generality
of the results." The important question we want to address is how much actual equilibrium
prices and actual portfolio-holdings in a general setting will dier from the predictions of
CAPM.
3 CAPM Without Mean-Variance Preferences
The assumption that all agents maximize a quadratic utility function is unattractive be-
cause it implies increasing absolute risk aversion. A more realistic assumption, and one
commonly made in macroeconomics and nance, is that agents' preferences exhibit con-
stant relative risk aversion. It is clear, however, that with these preferences agents' will
care about higher moments and that therefore a mean-variance analysis is not valid. The
following example shows that a mean-variance utility function does not even serve as a
good approximation of a constant relative risk aversion utility function.
Example 3.1: Consider an agent with utility function u
h
(c
h
) =
P
3
s=1

s
v
h
(c
h
s
); where

s
= 1=3; s = 1; 2; 3; and v
h
(c
h
s
) =  1=3(c
h
s
)
 3
; which corresponds to a utility function
with constant relative risk aversion equal to 4: For simplicity we assume that the household
has no income at t = 0 and does not derive utility from consumption in that period. Con-
sider the consumption of two income streams, (0:8; 0:8; 1:4) and (0:6; 1:2; 1:2); that have
the same mean and variance. Any mean-variance utility function should therefore consider
both income streams as being equally good. When an agent has a constant relative risk
aversion utility function, the second income stream is less preferred, as the income in the
rst state is 40% lower than average income, whereas the income at the bad states of the
rst income stream are only 20% below average income, u
h
(0:8; 0:8; 1:4) =  0:475 and
u
h
(0:6; 1:2; 1:2) =  0:643: Even if for the second income prole, income is increased by
10% in every state, we get u
h
(0:66; 1:32; 1:32) =  0:483; so it would still be inferior to
the income stream (0:8; 0:8; 1:4): This phenomenon becomes even more severe when two
income streams with the same, higher variance are compared or when a more risk averse
agent is considered.
A standard way to calibrate equilibrium models under uncertainty is to assume that
there are several uncorrelated shocks and to choose the magnitude of the shocks to match
aggregate rst and second moments. From now on we examine an economy with three
10
heterogeneous agents, representing classes of agents with low, medium or high incomes.
Each agent is endowed with an initial portfolio (0; 
h
 
) of the riskless bond and the
available stocks,
5
with current income, representing current labor income plus dividends
from 
h
 
; e
1
0
= 2=3; e
2
0
= 1; and e
3
0
= 4=3; and with stochastic future labor income given by
some l
h
2 IR
S
++
: We are back in the framework of Section 2 by setting e
1
0
= 2=3, e
2
0
= 1
and e
3
0
= 4=3; and
e
h
= l
h
+
P
J
j=2

h
 j
d
j
for h = 1; :::; H. For each household h; the labor
incomes l
h
s
are generated by S independent draws from some given distribution. In this
way we can obtain a discrete approximation of any continuous distribution.
The rst agent has no capital income, 
1
 
= 0: For the other agents we have 
2
 
=
1=3  1
J 1
and 
3
 
= 2=3  1
J 1
. In most applications agents have heterogeneous von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions with identical uniform probabilities over states
and identical discount factors 
h
= 0:95.
The assets available are given by a riskless bond and seven stocks. In most examples the
dividends of asset j depend on a single common factor f 2 IR
S
as well as on an idiosyncratic
shock "
j
2 IR
S
. We denote asset j's load in the factor by c
j
, varying from 0:25 to 1:75
in steps of 0:25. The examples are calibrated to yearly US data. The expected growth
rate of aggregate consumption equals two percent and the standard deviation of both the
factor and the idiosyncratic shock determining the dividends are about 0:13 - giving an
overall standard deviation of the stock market of about 0:17. The standard deviation of
labor income is chosen to be around 0:10 and labor income constitutes around 2=3 of total
income. The eleven random variables in the model are therefore ((l
h
)
h=1;:::;H
; f; ("
j
)
j=2;:::;J
).
As a rst example we analyze the case where the realization of each random variable
is either high or low with equal probabilities, and all random variables are independent.
The minimal state space to achieve this consists of 2
11
= 2; 048 states. More specically
we have that
l
h
s
2 f2=3  (1:02  0:1); 2=3  (1:02 + 0:1)g;
f
s
2 f 0:13; 0:13g;
"
j
s
2 f 0:13; 0:13g:
Dividends of asset j are then determined by
d
j
s
= 1=3  1=7  (1:02 +
p
c
j
f
s
+ "
j
s
):
We assume that all agents have constant relative risk aversion utility functions of the form
v
h
(c
h
s
) =
(c
h
s
)
1 
h
1  
h
; c
h
s
> 0;
where 
h
is the coecient of relative risk aversion. We choose 
1
= 6; 
2
= 4 and 
3
= 2:
With these specications we compute the equilibrium prices and portfolio-holdings and
compare them to the predictions of the CAPM in Figure 1. To do those computations, we
5
Note that contrary to the model described in Section 2, we assume now that stocks are in unit net
supply.
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could in principle use the homotopy algorithms as reported in Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves
(1996) or Schmedders (1998), which can solve for an equilibrium in the general multiple
commodities GEI-model. The problem is that for both algorithms the number of equations
to be solved is a multiple of the number of states, whereas the number of states is 1,024
for the current economy and 32,768 for the other economies considered in this paper. This
makes both algorithms unsuitable for our purposes. In Herings and Kubler (2000) we
develop an algorithm that is tailored to the nance GEI-model with one good per state,
and that is independent of the number of states. Instead, the number of equations to be
solved is related to the number of assets, which is 8 for most economies analyzed in this
paper. Our algorithm therefore allows for an eective and ecient computation in nance
economies, which is imperative to address the issues in this paper.
The solid line in the gure is the security market line, i.e. the CAPM relationship
between a portfolio's  and its risk premium. The actual equilibrium expected returns of
the seven securities are depicted by + and lie all almost exactly on the security market line.
CAPM turns out to be an extraordinarily good predictor for the actual equilibrium returns
of assets in this example. This is surprising as preferences are far from mean-variance, and
asset returns are far from being normally distributed.
Although the graph of Figure 1 looks very convincing, it is clear that we need more
objective measures to quantify the deviation of equilibrium prices and portfolio-holdings
from the CAPM predictions. Note that we need to check both the robustness of two-fund
separation and the robustness of the pricing-formula. With general preferences CAPM-
pricing is neither necessary nor sucient for two-fund separation. It is easy to see that two-
fund separation does not imply CAPM-pricing. Consider a model with complete markets
where all agents have identical constant absolute risk aversion preferences. It is well known
that two-fund separation holds since there exists a linear sharing rule, see also Cass and
Stiglitz (1970). However, it is easy to see that generally


A
= proj
hAi
0
@

h
@
c
h
1
v
h
1
(e
1
)
@
c
h
0
v
h
0
(e
0
)
; : : : ;

h
@
c
h
S
v
h
S
(e
S
)
@
c
h
0
v
h
0
(e
0
)
1
A
=
0
@

h
@
c
h
1
v
h
1
(e
1
)
@
c
h
0
v
h
0
(e
0
)
; : : : ;

h
@
c
h
S
v
h
S
(e
S
)
@
c
h
0
v
h
0
(e
0
)
1
A
=2 h1
S
;
e
i:
Conversely, suppose prices of assets consistent with CAPM-pricing are given, and let asset
markets be complete for simplicity. It is easy to choose individual consumption bundles
which do not belong to h1
S
;
e
i and utility functions for which the individual consumption
bundles are optimal at the asset prices chosen.
The most straightforward approach is to measure the accuracy of CAPM-pricing is to
take the Mean Squared Error (MSE), which is dened by
MSE =
v
u
u
u
t
1
J   1
J
X
j=2
(r

j
 
b
r
j
)
2
;
where r

j
denotes the equilibrium expected return of asset j and
b
r
j
the prediction by CAPM.
A dierent approach consists of the following. By the arguments used in the proof
of Theorem 2.3 it is obvious that 

A
2 h1
S
;
e
M
i is sucient for CAPM-pricing. That
12
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Figure 1: Security market line with high-low returns.
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this is necessary as well follows from the observation that otherwise 

A
is equal to the
sum of its projection on h1
S
;
e
M
i plus a non-zero orthogonal part in hAi under the inner
product : When CAPM-pricing is valid, the orthogonal part should have zero price, which
is obviously not the case when priced by 

A
: Therefore, an interesting alternative to MSE
is to take the OLS R
2
of the regression with
proj
hAi
0
@
@
c
h
1
u
h
(c
h
)=
1
@
c
h
0
u
h
(c
h
)
; : : : ;
@
c
h
S
u
h
(c
h
)=
s
@
c
h
0
u
h
(c
h
)
1
A
as regressand and 1
S
and
e
M
as regressors. Notice that this measure is independent of h:
We call it Pricing R
2
:
To measure how well two-fund separation holds for agent h; we take the OLS R
2
of the
regression with (
h
j
)
j=2;:::;J
as regressand and
b

M
; the risky part of the market portfolio,
as regressor.
The following table conrms that CAPM provides an outstanding prediction for the
economy under consideration.
R
f
1.0633
Equity Premium 0.0185
MSE 0.0000530
Pricing R
2
0.99999998
Two-fund R
2
h = 1 0.9999988
Two-fund R
2
h = 2 0.9999994
Two-fund R
2
h = 3 0.9999998
Table 1: CAPM for CRRA preferences and two-point distributions.
Although the high-low specications for the random variables are two-point approxi-
mations to normal random variables the well-known fact that CAPM holds with normally
distributed returns does not imply anything about the validity of CAPM in this framework.
It is easy to see that two-point approximations to normal random variables do not satisfy
the properties of elliptical distributions. The following trivial example shows that while
each dividends distribution is characterized by its mean and variance it is not true that a
linear combination of these random variables is also fully characterized by its mean and
variance.
Example 3.2: Consider a model with 4 states where all probabilities are equal. Let
d
1
=
0
B
B
B
B
@
 0:5
 0:5
0:5
0:5
1
C
C
C
C
A
; d
2
=
0
B
B
B
B
@
0:5
 0:5
0:5
 0:5
1
C
C
C
C
A
:
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Both d
1
and d
2
are discrete distributions such that with probability 1=2 the realization is
 0:5 and with probability 1=2 the realization is 0:5: However, both d
1
+ d
2
and
p
2d
1
have
expectation zero and variance 1=2; but correspond to dierent distributions and dierent
utilities when the utility function is not mean-variance.
One should not expect CAPM to hold in this model even though the distributions
provide a (very crude) approximation to normal distributions.
Also the fact that two-fund separation holds so well, comes as a surprise. Since the
households we are dealing with have dierent parameters of relative risk aversion, there
is no reason to expect that two fund separation obtains, see Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and
Detemple and Gottardi (1998).
4 Robustness in Preferences
In order to show that the predictions of CAPM are a good approximation for equilibria
in a wide variety of economic settings we compute 600 examples. We assume that there
are S = 32; 768 states of nature. Using a large number of states guarantees that our nal
samples are good approximations of continuous distributions. By taking a large number
of states we rule out nite sample eects on the prices of assets. When we replicate the
experiment and generate economies out of a newly drawn sample, the equilibrium will be
almost the same if the number of states is suciently large.
Throughout this section we assume that all random variables are log-normally dis-
tributed, so l
h
s
; f
s
; and "
j
s
are drawn independently from a log-normal distribution. The
log-normal distribution with mean  and variance 
2
is denoted by LN(; 
2
): Since we
are considering nite samples, the drawing will be of (some) inuence on the equilibrium
we compute. As before asset 1 is the riskless bond. For j  2; we dene asset j's dividend
to be
d
j
s
= 1=3  1=7  1:02  f
j
s
 "
j
s
and we choose
l
h
s
 LN(2=3  1:02; (2=3)
2
 0:01);
f
j
s
 LN(1; c
j
 0:0161);
"
j
s
 LN(1; 0:0161):
The actual (f
j
s
)
J
j=2
are all based on a single realization of a normal random variable
b
f
s
:
For each asset j; we linearly transform the realization of this random variable in such a
way that after taking the exponent a log-normally distributed random variable with mean
1 and variance c
j
 0:0161 results. The construction of the random variables implies that
all dividends themselves are log-normally distributed. To get a similar variance of the
entire stock market as before the variance of the factors and the idiosyncratic shock have
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to be chosen to be 0:0161 instead of 0:0169. Notice that the factor realization does not
enter linearly in the formula for the asset's dividends, an assumption that is made in most
models describing factor economies. This is an additional advantage as it puts CAPM only
more seriously to the robustness test. Finally, it follows from the work of Feldstein (1969)
that log-normal distributions do not belong to the elliptic class, and would not admit of
two-fund separation.
We consider three dierent families of utility functions and compute fty randomly
generated examples within each class. For each class we report histograms of the MSE,
the Pricing R
2
; and the Two-fund R
2
of agent 2 and 3. By market clearing, the portfolio-
holdings of agent 1 are fully dependent on those of agents 2 and 3. If two-fund separation
holds exactly for agents 2 and 3 it will hold exactly for agent 1 as well. Therefore, we safe
space and do not report the Two-fund R
2
of agent 1. In all histograms the scaling is taken
identically, so that results for dierent models can be compared easily.
We rst assume that all agents' utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aver,
i.e.
v
h
(c
h
s
) =   exp(
h
c
h
s
); c
h
s
2 IR;
where 
h
is the coecient of absolute risk aversion. We then move on and examine an
economy where all agents' utility functions exhibit constant relative risk aversion, i.e.
v
h
(c
h
s
) =
(c
h
s
)
1 
h
1  
h
; c
h
s
> 0; 
h
6= 1;
v
h
(c
h
s
) = log(c
h
s
); c
h
s
> 0; 
h
= 1;
where 
h
is the coecient of relative risk aversion.
The rationale for examining both constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative
risk aversion is as follows. Kenneth Arrow has repeatedly argued that it is realistic assume
increasing absolute risk aversion and non-increasing relative risk aversion. By covering the
two extreme cases of constant absolute and constant relative risk aversion we want to argue
that CAPM provides a good approximation for pricing for all specications which satisfy
Arrow's criteria.
4.1 Random CARA
We randomly generate 100 examples of economies where all agents have constant absolute
risk aversion. For each example we draw the coecient of risk aversion 
h
, h = 1; 2; 3;
from a uniform distribution on the interval [0:5; 10]: Comparisons between the computed
equilibria and the CAPM predictions are depicted in the histograms of Figures 2a-d.
6
Obviously CAPM predicts extremely well. The mean squared error always lies below
0:04 percent. In most cases it is around 0:5  10
 4
: The Pricing R
2
exceeds 0:9999 in all
6
The Pricing R
2
is multiplied by 100 to avoid round-o to 1.000 by our software.
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Figure 2a: CARA: MSE.
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Figure 2c: CARA: Two-fund
separation agent 2.
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Figure 2d: CARA: Two-fund
separation agent 3.
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examples. The Two-fund R
2
exceeds 0:99 in most cases. Compared to the single example
examined in Section 3, the results are slightly worse on average. Figure 3 claries that this
can be entirely explained by higher values for the average rate of risk aversion present in
the economy. The MSE increases with average risk aversion in the economy, as measured
by the harmonic mean of the 
h
's (it is well known that the harmonic mean is the right
measure for average risk aversion in an economy where all agents have constant absolute
risk aversion).
Although CAPM remains an excellent predictor for all cases examined so far, Figure 3
indicates that CAPM is a better tool in environments with lower average risk aversion. In
the light of this result one might be tempted to draw a parallel between our results and
the observation of Mehra and Prescott (1985) that realistic values of risk-aversion do not
produce a realistic equilibrium risk-premium. If the equilibrium returns of risky assets do
not change signicantly with small variations of agents' coecient of relative risk aversion
it can be expected that the cross section remains almost unchanged and that CAPM
(which predicts excess returns independently of preferences) provides a good prediction for
a variety of attitudes towards risk. Note, however, that this can only explain one side of
the phenomena - the question remains why the cross-section of returns can be described
by the assets' 's.
4.2 Random CRRA
We now assume that all agents have constant relative risk aversion and we draw 
h
, h =
1; 2; 3; from a uniform distribution on the interval [0:5; 10]: With mean household income
equal to 1; the degree of risk-aversion in the economy is similar to the CRRA-case examined
in Subsection 4.1. As before we compute 100 examples - Figures 4a-d report the analogues
of Figures 2a-d for the CRRA case.
Figure 4 shows that CAPM is an excellent predictor for the class of CRRA utility
functions, both in terms of pricing and in terms of two-fund separation. In most cases
MSE is around 1  10
 4
: The worst Pricing R
2
found is 0:99995 and the worst Two-fund
R
2
is 0:95:
The high values of the Pricing R
2
provides very useful information for the pricing of
assets. Recall that the price of asset j is given by 

A
d
j
: Any vector that is highly correlated
with 

A
should lead to a similar price for asset j: In particular, when the Pricing R
2
is
close to one, CAPM is bound to give almost exact equilibrium prices and the use of CAPM
leads to a low MSE.
4.3 Loss Aversion
To demonstrate that our results do not depend on state independent utility, we analyze
a class of utility functions that are state dependent and that are characterized by loss
aversion. Such utility functions get support from empirical work on the decision making
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Figure 3: MSE against Risk-Aversion for CRRA preferences.
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of agents. They are also claimed to be helpful in explaining the equity premium puzzle of
Mehra and Prescott (1985), see Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
We cannot use exactly the same utility functions as Benartzi and Thaler, as these are
not everywhere quasi-concave, and as a consequence a competitive equilibrium may not
exist. The important characteristic of loss-aversion is not so much the existence of non-
concavities, but a sharp decrease in utility when loosing income compared to the status
quo and only a mild increase in utility when gaining income. This is usually modeled by
a utility function that has a kink at the status quo.
We generate a utility function with loss aversion as follows. We identify the status quo
of an agent h in state s  1 with e
h
s
: Then loss aversion applies to making good or bad
investment decisions on the stock market. Consistent with Benartzi and Thaler (1995),
we want a Bernoulli function v
h
s
such that lim
c
h
s
"e
h
s
@v
h
s
(c
h
s
) = 2 lim
c
h
s
#e
h
s
@v
h
s
(c
h
s
): For each h;
we choose parameters 
h
1
and 
h
2
: When c
h
s
 e
h
s
; then v
h
s
coincides with a CRRA utility
function with parameter of relative risk aversion 
h
1
: When c
h
s
 e
h
s
; then v
h
s
coincides with
a CRRA utility function with parameter of relative risk aversion 
h
2
; plus a term linear in
c
h
s
to get lim
c
h
s
"e
h
s
@v
h
s
(c
h
s
) = 2 lim
c
h
s
#e
h
s
@v
h
s
(c
h
s
); plus a constant k
s
to make v
h
s
continuous.
More precisely, we assume that u
h
(c
h
) = v
h
0
(c
h
0
) + 
h
P
S
s=1

s
v
h
s
(c
h
s
), where
v
h
0
(c
h
0
) = (c
h
0
)
1 
h
1
=(1  
h
1
);
v
h
s
(c
h
s
) = (c
h
s
)
1 
h
2
=(1  
h
2
) + (

2

1
(e
h
s
)
 
h
1
  (e
h
s
)
 
h
2
)c
h
s
+ k
s
; c
h
s
 e
h
s
;
v
h
s
(c
h
s
) = (c
h
s
)
1 
h
1
=(1  
h
1
); c
h
s
 e
h
s
;
with
k
s
=

2
1  
2
(e
h
s
)
1 
h
2
+

h
1

h
2
+ 
h
1
  
h
2

h
1
(1  
h
1
)
(e
h
s
)
1 
h
1
:
The Bernoulli function v
h
s
is continuous and is continuously dierentiable except at e
h
s
where it has a kink. It can be shown that the coecient of relative risk aversion varies
continuously in c
h
s
and is given by (
h
1

h
2
(c
h
s
)
 
h
2
)=(
h
2
(e
h
s
)
 
h
1
  
h
1
(e
h
s
)
 
h
2
+ 
h
1
(c
h
s
)
 
h
2
) if
c
h
s
 e
h
s
, so it approaches 
h
2
as c
h
s
! 0: The coecient of relative risk aversion is given by

h
1
if c
h
s
 e
h
s
.
Since v
h
s
is not dierentiable at e
h
s
it does not satisfy the assumptions under which the
algorithm has been shown to be convergent. We have to smooth out the kinks of the utility
function. We can do this by taking any e
h 
s
; e
h+
s
such that e
h 
s
< e
h
s
< e
h+
s
and dening
@v
h
s
(c
h
s
) =
e
h+
s
  c
h
s
e
h+
s
  e
h 
s
@v
h
s
(e
h 
s
) +
c
h
s
  e
h 
s
e
h+
s
  e
h 
s
@v
h
s
(e
h+
s
):
In principle, the parameter k
s
has to be adjusted to make v
h
s
continuous. Since our algo-
rithm works entirely with rst order conditions, this is of no concern to us. In the numerical
experiments we took e
h 
s
= 0:95e
h
s
and e
h+
s
= 1:05e
h
s
. For each example we take 
h
1
= 
h
2
=2
and we draw 
h
2
, h = 1; 2; 3; from a uniform distribution on the interval [1; 6]. In this way
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fty economies are randomly generated. The outcomes of our computations are presented
in Figures 5a-d.
It turns out that CAPM is an extraordinarily good predictor for the case with loss
aversion. The results seem to be even better than for the CRRA and CARA cases examined
before. In most cases, MSE is below 1 10
 4
; Pricing R
2
exceeds 0:99999; and the Two-fund
R
2
exceeds 0:98: If we take into account that the examples with loss aversion are such that
the degree of risk aversion is lower on average than before, the Pricing R
2
is comparable
to the one found for CRRA and CARA preferences.
5 Robustness in Return Processes
We now x agents' preferences to exhibit constant relative risk aversion and choose 
1
= 6;

2
= 4; and 
3
= 2: We test the robustness of our results to variations in the distributions
of endowments and assets. We consider three dierent families of return processes and
compute 100 randomly generated examples within each class. We show the histograms of
MSE, Pricing R
2
; and Two-fund R
2
of agents 2 and 3.
5.1 Uniform Returns
In order to verify whether our results depend on the assumption of log-normal shocks, we
now assume that all shocks are uniformly distributed. We also allow for some variation in
the ratio of labor income to total income, in the variance of the factor and in the variance
of the idiosyncratic shocks.
We start each example by randomly generating parameters a
1
; a
2
; a
3
and a
4
; where
a
1
 U(1:02  0:5; 1:02  0:9);
a
2
 U(1:02  1:1; 1:02  1:5);
a
3
 U( 0:5; 0:1);
a
4
 U(0:1; 0:5):
Given a realization for a
1
; : : : ; a
4
; we continue the construction of the economy by taking
independent drawings for l
h
s
; f
s
and "
j
s
; where
l
h
s
 U(2=3  0:8; 2=3  1:24);
f
s
 U((a
1
  a
2
)=2; (a
2
  a
1
)=2);
"
j
s
 U(a
3
; a
4
):
Finally, dividends are determined by
d
j
s
= 1=3  1=7  (
a
1
+ a
2
2
+
p
c
j
f
s
+ "
j
s
):
Given the realizations for the parameters a
1
and a
2
; 1=3  1=7  (a
1
+ a
2
)=2 equals expected
dividends from asset j: The realization of the factor belongs to the interval [(a
1
 a
2
)=2; (a
2
 
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a1
)=2] and the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks to the interval [a
3
; a
4
]: The expected
labor income and the variance of labor income are taken as before.
Figures 6a-d show that the ability of CAPM to predict portfolio-holdings and excess
returns is robust to the exact specication of the distribution of shocks. The results are very
close to the ones obtained for the base case with log-normal shocks examined in Section 3,
where the average degree of risk aversion in the economy is similar.
5.2 More Factors
One might wonder whether our results are not simply due to the fact that we have all risky
assets being inuenced by a single common factor. In fact, it is possible to derive CAPM
as a special case of APT where there is only one factor, see for instance Connor (1984).
However, such a derivation requires an uncountable number (or at least very large number)
of assets to diversify the idiosyncratic shocks away. The importance of idiosyncratic shock
is quite substantial in our economies with only seven risky assets. Moreover, usually factors
enter linearly in the denition of an asset's pay-o, which is not always the case in our
economies. It seems therefore not likely that our results are due to the single factor set-up.
Other suspicious elements of the set-up we used so far are that factor loads are dis-
tributed very symmetrically and balanced, and that the importance of idiosyncratic shocks
is the same for all assets. Finally, we consider a wider range for the variance of the entire
stock market.
In this subsection we generate a number of economies where risky assets depend on two
factors, f and
b
f; and factor loads for each one of the assets are randomly drawn. On top
of this, also the importance of the idiosyncratic shock is randomly determined.
We start each example by randomly generating, for each asset j = 2; : : : ; J; parameters
c
j
;
b
c
j
; and i
j
: These parameters represent the load in factor 1, the load in factor 2 and the
importance of the idiosyncratic shock. More specically it holds that
c
j
 U(0; 2);
b
c
j
 U(0; 2);
i
j
 U(0; 4):
Labor income, the two factors and assets' idiosyncratic shocks are independently log-
normally distributed, so l
h
s
; f
s
;
b
f
s
; and "
j
s
are drawn from a log-normal distribution,
l
h
s
 LN(2=3  1:02; (2=3)
2
 0:01);
f
j
s
 LN(1; c
j
 0:0161);
b
f
j
s
 LN(1;
b
c
j
 0:0161);
"
j
s
 LN(1; i
j
 0:0161):
Finally, dividends are determined by
d
j
s
= 1=3  1=7  1:02  f
j
s

b
f
j
s
 "
j
s
:
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The way to generate f
j
s
; j = 2; : : : ; J; from a single realization of a normally distributed
random variable is the same as in Section 3. The same applies to the other factor.
From Figure 7 we may conclude that the one factor framework is certainly not the
driving force that makes CAPM work. Also in the two factor set-up, for a variety of factor
loads, with assets that are dierent in the importance of the idiosyncratic shocks, CAPM
turns out to be an excellent model.
5.3 Options
Since markets are incomplete the introduction of an option on one of the assets will gener-
ally change all equilibrium prices (see Detemple and Selden (1991)). Therefore one might
expect that the introduction of an option worsens CAPM-pricing considerably. Further-
more, given the robustness of CAPM in the earlier examples, it is interesting to see if it
is possible to give an equilibrium pricing formula for options in incomplete markets via
CAPM.
Another reason to introduce an option is that this is an asset with the capacity to
seriously alter the higher order moments of an asset portfolio. One possible explanation
for our results obtained so far is that asset markets are very incomplete, which makes it
dicult for households to change the higher order moments of the returns of their portfolios.
Although households care for higher order moments, the mix of marketed assets makes it
dicult to aect the higher order moments. With the introduction of an option this clearly
changes. Agents have then a possibility to limit downwards risk, which is exactly the kind of
risk agents with CRRA utility functions are concerned about, but mean-variance optimizers
are not.
In order to investigate this issue more closely we introduce a call option on the most
risky asset. Specically we have a 9-th security which pays max(d
j
s
 X; 0) in state s, with
X the strike price of the call option.
Suppose we consider the uniquely determined equilibrium pricing vector 

A
of the
economy without the option, and we use this pricing vector to price the option. Given the
reasoning of the previous paragraph, at those prices one would expect the call option (in
combination with the bond) to be more attractive to the agents than the stock, exactly
because of the higher order moments. So the equilibrium price of the call option should be
higher than the one computed by CAPM-pricing, in order to make that asset less appealing.
As a consequence, the expected equilibrium return of the call option should be less than
the one predicted by CAPM.
To examine dierent options, we draw X out of the uniform distribution for each
example. To avoid options that are either too far in or too far out of the money we
determine in each example the minimal dividend paid out by asset 8; d
8
= min
s=1;:::;S
d
8
s
;
and the maximal dividend paid out, d
8
= max
s=1;:::;S
d
8
s
: We then draw X out of a uniform
distribution on [0:5  (1:02 + d
8
); 0:5  (1:02 + d
8
)]: Note that 1:02 is the expected dividend
of asset 8. The strike price is always between the average of the minimal dividend and the
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expected dividend, and the average of the expected dividend and the maximal dividend.
The results are given in Figures 8a-d.
The MSE in Figure 8 refers to the MSE of the pricing of the stocks only. The option
is analyzed in detail in Figure 9. It turns out that the MSE, and the Two-fund R
2
are
comparable to the ones given before. The Pricing R
2
is somewhat less good than before,
but is still excellent. Surprisingly, we have found no systematic eect of the introduction
of the option on the price of asset 8. In some examples the introduction of an option raised
the price above the CAPM-prediction, in others it has been lower.
Figure 9 analyzes the pricing of the option by CAPM. According to CAPM, a call option
is a very risky asset. It has zero pay-os in bad states of nature, and very high in good states
of nature. The covariance of a call option with the market portfolio is very high, which is
also clear from Figure 9, where it is shown that the option's  varied from 5 to 35 in the
economies generated. Notice that, as we expected, there is indeed an over-prediction of the
expected return of an option by CAPM. In all economies generated, CAPM underpriced
the call option. The misprediction was relatively small when the option's  is low, say
below 10, but may get quite severe for call options with a very high strike price, which
are the ones with a high : Notice, however, that a higher  of an option also corresponds
to a higher excess return, which makes the relative misprediction less bad. Still, the over-
prediction of call option returns is more than linearly increasing in an option's ; whereas
the excess return itself is still roughly linear.
It is surprising that the Pricing R
2
and the MSEs of stocks remained so good in all
economies, even when the option was sometimes seriously under-priced by CAPM. In fact,
it may even be perceived as an inconsistency that the PricingR
2
is virtually exactly correct,
and the option is seriously mispriced. Indeed, when CAPM-pricing is highly correlated with


A
; almost all assets are priced very well. The only exceptions are those like options with
a very high strike price. Such an asset pays o in a few (less than 10) states of the 32,768
only. A high correlation with 

A
is not inconsistent with a fairly dierent state price in a
negligible fraction of states only.
6 Interpretation and Conclusion
In order to show that the CAPM-pricing formula holds, one needs strong assumptions either
on preferences or on dividends and endowments (see Berk (1996)). However, examining the
robustness of CAPM by computing equilibria, we nd that CAPM provides an excellent
approximation to equilibrium excess returns and portfolio-holdings for a wide variety of
preferences, dividends and endowments.
This result is very puzzling for two separate reasons. First, there is no a priori reason
why in the absence of mean-variance prefernces or normal returns, the CAPM-pricing
formula should provide a good approximation to actual equilibrium prices if there is only
one agent in the economy or if markets are complete (which is observationally equivalent).
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Secondly one would expect the presence of heterogeneous agents and incomplete nancial
markets to alter the pricing implications of consumption based pricing models signicantly.
We compute the complete market equilibirum for the examples considered. In almost
all of the cases the complete markets pricing errors lie even below the incomplete market
errors. In order to understand this rst puzzle, consider the simplest possible setup with a
single agent who has log-utility and no labor-income. Suppose that the dividends of stocks
j = 2; :::; 8 are given by
d
j
s
= 
j
(+ "
1
s
) + "
j
s
;
where all " are iid. From Section 2 we know that if we normalize e
0
= 1 the pricing errors
of the CAPM pricing formula for asset j is given by
 = Ed
j
 
E(d
j
=~e)
E(1=~e)
  (E~e 
1
E(1=~e)
)
cov(d
j
; ~e)
var(~e)
The results in this paper might become a little more plausible if one realizes that if factor-
weights (
j
)
j=2;:::;8
are such that
P
8
j=2

j
= 1 then  = 0. Substituting for d
j
and ~e, since
there are 7 stocks and since
cov(d
j
;~e)
var(~e)
= (
j
+ 1)=8 we obtain
 = 
j
 
E

j
(+
1
)+
j
+
P
8
i=1

i
E
1
+
P
8
i=1

i
 
0
B
@
 
1
E
1
+
P
8
i=1

i
1
C
A
(
j
+ 1)=8
In order to show that  = 0 the crucial insight is that
E

j
+
P
8
i=1

i
  1=8
E
1
+
P
8
i=1

i
+ 1=8 = 0:
For
P
8
j=2

j
6= 1,  6= 0 but the resulting pricing errors are small. As long as the coecient
of relative risk aversion remains low the pricing errors remain low if we vary the utility
functions (see Figure 3).
However, while this argument shows that given our calibration one would expect CAPM
to provide a good approximation to prices if there is only a single agent, one has to compute
equilibria in order to assess how well CAPM predicts equilibrium prices in economies
with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. Our current computational experience
suggests that CAPM is an excellent tool to price assets in realistically calibrated economies
with incomplete markets. The results seem to be robust for a wide variety of cases. The
form of the utility functions, the distribution of the shocks, the number of factors, and the
introduction of options do not aect our results. The question which then arises out of the
analysis in this paper is why the presence of incomplete markets does not have signicant
eects on cross-sectional returns.
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